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Africa lags behind other regions in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In some 
circumstances, there are obvious explanations for the absence of FDI, such as a high 
incidence of war. In this paper, we examine the role that monetary and exchange rate policy 
may have played in explaining this outcome. Specifically, we document the incidence of 
inflationary episodes and currency crashes in order to compare countries within the region 
as well as to make comparisons with other regions. Furthermore, since monetary policy can 
range from very transparent to very opaque, we assess Africa’s track record with dual and 
parallel markets. We use the parallel market premia as an indicator of the degree of 
distortions and extent of transparency. Our findings, suggest that this is a promising line of 
inquiry because Africa does stand apart from other regions in this measure of transparency. 
We also discuss some of the fiscal underpinnings of Africa’s bouts with high inflation. 
 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: F0, F4 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
 Strong, stable macroeconomic policies are not sufficient conditions for investment 
and growth. Among many other important factors is the transparency of macroeconomic 
policies, robust institutions, low levels of corruption, absence of wars, openness to trade, and 
a favorable external environment. But macroeconomic policy stability—especially price 
stability—is almost certainly an essential ingredient. Without it, the risks to doing business 
rise drastically, internal trade is significantly hampered, and external trade even more so. 
High and unpredictable inflation, especially, cripples business planning and checks the 
development of financial intermediation within the private sector. Because this is well 
known, many countries throughout the world have strived to achieve notable success in 
bringing down inflation since the 1980s in the industrialized countries and especially over 
the 1990s, in emerging markets and developing countries. The key to achieve this is well-
known and well-proven: a strong, independent central bank that places a high weight on 
maintaining low inflation. 
 
 Whether this low inflation is attained through appointing skilled, highly competent 
central bankers who are known to be committed to price stability—the most common 
approach—or through a more complex institutionalized system of checks and balances—or 
both, is second-order compared to maintaining meaningful central bank independence. 
 
 Some have argued that this prescription cannot be transferred to sub-Saharan Africa 
because many countries in the region are in too early phases of political development. These 
countries, according to this argument, lack the necessary institutional structure to establish a 
meaningfully independent central bank. If the judiciary and the Parliament are unduly 
influenced by the chief executive or the rule of law is in some other ways indistinct, the 
central bank has nowhere to hide. In such circumstances, when the chief executive phones 
the head of the central bank and asks for funds, the central bank can hardly refuse. Because 
of these internal pressures, many African countries have sought to import price stability 
through joining a regional currency or joining a regional currency block anchored to a 
reserve currency, such as the euro or the dollar.  
 
Aside from currency arrangements, many developing countries must, by necessity, 
put a high premium on attracting foreign direct investment. Yet, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa does not depend on whether the large economies, 
such as the United States are in recession or not. Furthermore, Africa did not benefit much 
from the surge in FDI to emerging markets during the 1990s. How can these nations achieve 
the climate of price stability needed to facilitate investment?  
 
 This is a difficult question that we shall attempt to address by examining some 
essential features of the historical experience of Africa with inflation and exchange rate 
arrangements, drawing on the extensive chronologies developed in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002)—that encompass all countries of the world. This historical perspective yields some 
useful insights. First, the typical inflation and exchange rate experience in post-colonial, non-
CFA Africa is weak compared with that Europe and Asia. But, even excluding the more 
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stable CFA franc zone countries, it is not notably worse than the experiences of many 
countries in Latin-America, the Middle East, or post-1980s transition economies. This may 
seem like feint praise, since so many countries in these other regions have such a chequered 
inflation history. But it is relevant if one wants to argue that Africa needs a completely 
different set of arrangements than elsewhere. Secondly, we find that the incidence of 
extremely high parallel exchange market premia of 50 percent or more (exceeding 
500 percent in some cases) is remarkably high in Africa, and herein lies the real differences. 
Averaging across all countries, between 1979 and 1998, the parallel premia in non-CFA sub-
Saharan Africa exceeded 50 percent more than one-third of the time! We argue that parallel 
premia at this level are highly problematic, in that they breed significant corruption and 
governance problems. As such, they are often an excellent barometer of broader and deeper 
problems in macroeconomic stabilization and governance. The case for advocating unified 
exchange rate regimes rests as much on improving governance and reducing corruption, as 
on any macroeconomic benefit. A third conclusion we reach is that adopting the currency of 
an industrialized country has its own set of problems, not the least astonishing incidence of 
frequent deflation. 
 
 The paper is divided into six parts, including this introduction. The second section of 
the paper briefly puts the post-colonial African exchange rate experience in perspective 
relative to Europe. The third section looks at the incidence of high inflation and the 
frequency of currency crashes in Africa compared to other regions. Here, our emphasis is in 
assessing the extent to which price and currency instability is behind the low observed levels 
of FDI. In our analysis of behavior of the parallel market premia in the fourth section, we 
find that the high probability of extremely large premia makes the African experience 
markedly different from the rest of the world. We argue that the high parallel premia may be 
symptomatic of more general governance problems in many cases, including corruption, and 
creating obstacles to trade—with deleterious consequences for FDI. The fifth section of the 
paper offers some insights on the root cause of inflation from a broad theoretical perspective. 
This perspective suggests that the funding needs of the fiscal authority—that is,--fiscal 
dominance—is likely to be significant problem for many of the highly indebted African 
countries. The concluding section speculates on options for Africa in the light of the 
experience.  
 
 
II.   THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN PERSPECTIVE 
Modern central banking is a relatively recent development. Only a couple hundred 
years ago, few countries in the world had the governmental checks and balances needed to 
maintain an independent central bank. As a case in point, the central bank of Spain began, in 
1782, as the Bank of St. Charles, founded originally as a quasi-private bank by King Charles 
III of Spain. The unabashed purpose was to help absorb government debt. The name of the 
bank itself speaks volumes about how (not) independent it was from the chief executive. 
When King Ferdinand came to the throne, the Bank of St. Charles became the Bank of St. 
Ferdinand. Only much later did it become the Bank of Spain, which today, of course, stands 
as a funding member of the nascent Euro-system. In the United States, efforts to sustain a 
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national central bank foundered twice during the nineteenth century. During that country’s 
civil war of 1861-65, the Confederate states abandoned the Yankee dollar and printed their 
own confederate currency. Civil wars are not an unusual feature of a relatively young state, 
nor are their monetary consequences. The modern U.S. Federal Reserve System was founded 
in 1913. But even during the first half of the twentieth century, the internal governance 
structures that helped to sustain its independence were less firmly established than they are 
today. In 1934, for example, the U.S. government invalidated gold contracts, and a few years 
later President Franklin D. Roosevelt seriously entertained expanding the United States 
Supreme Court from nine members to eighteen or twenty in order to stack the court with 
Justices that would support his programs. Eventually he abandoned this proposal, but the 
point is that even in relatively modern day experience, governance structures continued to 
evolve. Similar examples can be given across the industrialized world. In that regard, the 
problems of Africa in establishing independent central banks are not unique to young nations, 
but the benefits can be great, and as modern central banking techniques continue to improve, 
there is a strong case to be made that improved monetary policy has been one factor in the 
greater stability of output and employment observed in many industrialized countries since 
the 1980s. This part is illustrated dramatically in Figure 2, which gives year-to-year changes 
in growth rates for the G-7 (Japan is an exception) and the world. As is evident from the 
figure, and can be confirmed by closer statistical analysis, output volatility has been dropping 
dramatically since the mid-1980s. Thus, while high inflation is often a symptom rather than a 
cause of growth problems, it can also be a problem in its own right. 
 
 
III.   HIGH INFLATION, CURRENCY CRASHES, AND FDI: IS AFRICA DIFFERENT? 
 The aim of this section is descriptive, as we neither offer nor test a formal model of 
the determinants of FDI to Africa nor to any other region.2 We begin by looking at some of 
the possible “pull” factors that may influence FDI. As to “push” factors, Reinhart and 
Reinhart (2001) show that FDI to developing countries has an important cyclical component, 
more so than other types of capital flows. As a general rule, FDI flows more heavily to 
emerging market economies when the United States economy is expanding than when it is in 
recession. This cyclical pattern has important consequences for the volume of FDI that 
developing countries in Asia and Western Hemisphere receive, as illustrated in Figure 1. Yet, 
the cycle is not relevant for African economies, which generally receive very little FDI at any 
stage of the U.S. cycle. Indeed, looking at panel data on total capital flows to Africa, Calvo 
and Reinhart (1997) conclude that, in contrast to other regions, the only external factor that 
systematically influences capital flows to Africa is world commodity prices. Flows increase 
during booms in commodity prices and, other things equal, decline during busts. In what 
follows, we document what could, in principle, be expected to be deterrents to investing in 
Africa. 
                                                 
2 See Kamaly (2001) for an interesting new study and for a comprehensive survey of the 
empirical literature on the determinants of FDI. 
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A.   The Basics for Attracting FDI 
 An obvious and powerful deterrent to FDI is political instability. Edwards (1990) 
finds that the political instability is always statistically significant, irrespective of what other 
variables are included as regressors in his cross-country regressions. Of course, wars are an 
extreme form of political instability—and Africa has had more than its share. Using the dates 
of wars provided in Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002), we constructed the probability of 
war for three regions, Africa, Asia, and Western Hemisphere (excluding Canada and the 
United States), over 1960-2001. This probability is simply the number of months during 
which there was a war over the total number of months for a particular country. We then 
average across countries to obtain the regional number. As shown in Table 1, the probability 
for Africa, at 12.6 percent, is almost twice as large as that of the developing Western 
Hemisphere but slightly below the number for Asia. However, column (3) paints a strikingly 
different picture—40 percent of the countries in Africa have had at least one war during 
1960-2001, 28 percent of the countries have had two or more. This is more than three times 
the incidence of war in Western Hemisphere and almost twice that of Asia. In the case of the 
latter, the higher probability shown in column (2) reflects that a smaller number of countries 
had longer wars. 
 
 While wars, per se, are a likely deterrent to FDI, wars also are often a source of 
another deterrent to FDI, inflation.  
 
 
Table 1. The Incidence of War: January 1960-December 2001 
 
 
Region 
 
(1) 
Probability of war: 
Percent of months during 
which there is conflict 
(2) 
Percent of countries in the 
region with at least one 
war during the sample 
(3) 
Regional susceptibility 
to war index: average 
of columns (2) and (3) 
(4) 
Africa 12.6 40.0 26.3 
Asia 13.9 23.9 19.4 
Western Hemisphere 
(excluding Canada 
and United States) 
 
6.4 13.3 9.9 
    Sources: Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002) and authors’ calculations 
 
 
B.   The Incidence of High Inflation and Currency Crashes 
 As a rule of thumb, we can take a 40 percent inflation rate over a 12-month period as 
the threshold over which price instability becomes seriously dysfunctional. In Africa, there 
are five countries where the average annual inflation rate over the 1970-2001 period 
exceeded 40 percent. These are shown in Table 2, alongside the probability of war, as 
measured by the percent of months during which there was conflict. For four of the five high-
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inflation cases, the probability of war was notably higher than for the rest of Africa.3 
Furthermore, for those four cases, not only is inflation well above the average than for the 
rest of the region—the probability of war is also well above the average for the remainder of 
the countries in the region. 
 
 Hence, it is an understatement to suggest that conflict, as well as the economic 
instability that it brings, can be expected to have deleterious consequences for the investment 
climate. For Africa, the cross-country correlation between the average inflation rate and the 
probability of war over the same period is 0.36 and is statistically significant. Apart from 
wars, however, inflation may also arise in peacetime when there is a problem of fiscal 
dominance—an issue that we take up later in greater detail. 
 
 
Table 2. African Countries for Which the Average Inflation Rate During 1970-2001 
is above 40 Percent 
 
Country Average annual inflation, 
1970-2001 
Percent of months during 
which there is conflict 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1,112.9 30.3 
Angola 345.4 96.3 
Uganda 67.2 18.5 
Ethiopia 43.0 65.2 
Zambia 41.1 0 
Regional Average excluding 
 
12.4 9.1 
    Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002)  
  and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 Over and beyond these more extreme cases, Tables 3 to 6 document other countries’ 
experiences with high inflation (above 40 percent). The tables provide information on the 
dates of high inflation episodes and their average duration in years and months.4 The main 
results that emerge from the more detailed country-by-country analysis is summarized in 
Table 7, which gives the regional averages for the probability that the twelve-month inflation 
rate is above 40 percent, as well as the average duration of the inflation spells. Table 7 also 
provides information on currency crashes, which we will discuss next. For North and CFA 
Africa, inflation is clearly not the critical issue, as these countries score well relative to other 
regions. [For the CFA franc zone countries, which are pegged to the French franc, the more 
considerable problem has been deflation, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) document.] The 
                                                 
3 Indeed, as can be documented from the worldwide historical exchange rate chronologies in 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced two 
hyperinflations since World War II. To date, no other country has had more than one. 
4 For an excellent review of the experiences with high inflation, see Végh (1992); and 
Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2001). 
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contrast that emerges from comparing non-CFA Africa to other regions is that Africa’s 
inflation track record is far worse than Asia’s track record. However, Africa’s inflation 
performance is not that different from the average for developing Europe and the Middle 
East. Most notably, Africa has a better historical record than that of the inflation-prone 
Western Hemisphere. This is an important finding, as we already alluded to in the 
introduction. Africa’s inflation record may not be strong, but it is not as exceptional as many 
have maintained. Therefore the extent to which special solutions are required should not be 
exaggerated. 
 
Of course, it is worth noting that FDI to high inflation Western Hemisphere region 
was also only a trickle during the 1980s, and that FDI only surged following the various 
efforts within many countries in the region to bring inflation under control. What these recent 
trends imply is that, going forward, Africa should focus on maintaining a climate of price 
stability. 
 
 
Table 3. High Inflation Spells: North Africa and CFA Franc Zone, 1965-2001 
 
Country Episodes of inflation above         
40 percent 
Total number of years and months 
with inflation above 40 percent 
North Africa   
  Algeria  1994:1-1995:1  13 months 
  Morocco   
  Tunisia   
  North Africa average   4 months 
Sub Saharan Africa, CFA 
  
  Benin  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
  Burkina Faso   
  Cameroon  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
  Central African Republic  1994:1-1995:1  13 months 
  Chad  1994:1-1995:1  13 months 
  Congo, Republic of  1994:1-1995:1  13 months 
  Equatorial Guinea  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
  Gabon  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
  Guinea-Bissau   
  Mali   
  Niger  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
  Senegal  1994:1-1994:11  11 months 
  Togo  1994:1-1994:12  1  year 
CFA Franc Zone average  
 
  9 months 
    Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fischer, Sahay  
  and Végh (2001), Mitchell (1982), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
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Table 4. High Inflation Spells: Sub Sahara non CFA Franc Zone, 1965-2001 
 
Country Episodes of inflation above        
40 percent 
Total number of years and months with 
inflation above 40 percent 
Angola 1991:3-2001:12 10 years, 9 months. 
Burundi 1978:1-1979:7 
1996:5-1997:5 
1 year, 6 month 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1967:1-1968:9 
1975:1-1984:8 
1987:2-1997:11 
21 years, 6 months 
 
Ethiopia 1990:6-1991:7 13 months 
Gambia 1985:1-1987:2 2 years, 1 month 
Ghana 1973:10-1984:5 
1986:4-1987:9 
1989:8-1990:9 
1994:3-1996:8 
1999:11-2001:4 
15 years, 11 months 
 
Guinea 1986:1-1986:12 1 year 
Kenya 1992:9-1994:3 2 years, 1 month 
Madagascar 1947:1-1948:12 
1994:1-1995:8 
2 years, 7 months 
Malawi 1993:11-1996:6 2 years, 7 months 
Mozambique 1993:6-1995:7 2 years, 1 month 
Nigeria 1983:4-1984:9 
1987:2-1989:12 
1991:6-1996:3 
9 years  
Rwanda   
Somalia 1978:11-1981:6 
1982:7-1986:8 
1987:2-1989:11 
9 years, 5 months 
Sudan 1978:11-1980:2 
1980:8-1981:8 
1983:9-1985:6 
1986:10-1997:4 
14 years, 6 months 
 
South Africa   
Swaziland   
Tanzania 1983:4-1985:3 
1992:6-1995:3 
7 years, 8 months 
 
Uganda 1981:1-1982:5 
1983:8-1990:4 
8 years 
Zambia 1985:1-1996:9 11 years, 8 months 
Zimbabwe 1991:5-1993:2 
1997:12-1999:12 
3 years, 10 months 
 
Non-CFA Franc Zone average 
 
 6 years, 7 months 
    Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fischer, Sahay and  
Végh (2001), Mitchell (1982), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
    Notes: Hyper inflation refers to Cagan’s definition—a hyperinflation begins in the month the rise in prices exceeds 50 
percent and ending in the month the monthly rise in prices drops below that amount and stays below. See Fischer, Sahay and 
Végh (2001) for a recent discussion of hyperinflations. 
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Table 5. High Inflation Spells: Asia, Europe, and Middle East, 1965-2001 
 
Country Episodes of inflation above         
40 percent 
Total number of years and months with 
inflation above 40 percent 
Asia   
  China, Hong Kong   
  China, Mainland   
  India   
  Indonesia 1972:7-1974:6 
1997:7-1999:3 
2 years, 9 months 
  Korea   
  Laos 1988:6-1990:4 
1997:4-2000:2 
3 years, 11 months 
  Malaysia   
  Myanmar 1972:8-1976:2 
1988:4-1989:5 
1990:5-1991:5 
1993:1-1994:1 
1996:8-1999:1 
9 years 
  Nepal   
  Pakistan   
  Philippines 1984:4-1985:2 10 months 
  Singapore   
  Sri Lanka   
  Thailand   
Asia average  1 year, 2 months 
Europe and Middle East  
 
  Egypt   
  Iceland 1973:5-1976:1 
1977:5-1984:5 
9 years, 8 months 
  Iran 1994:2-1996:2 2 years 
  Iraq   
  Israel 1951:1-1951:12 
1973:10-1986:12  
14 years, 2 months 
  Jordan   
  Lebanon 1984:3-1993:3 9 years 
  Libya, Arab Republic   
  Poland 1988:1-1992:12 4 years, 11months 
  Romania 1990:10-2001:3 11 years, 5 months 
  Saudi Arabia   
  Turkey 1976:9-1981:3 
1983:4-2001:12 
22 years, 2 months 
Europe and Middle East average  6 years, 1 month 
    Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fischer, Sahay and   
 Végh (2001), Mitchell (1982), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
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Table 6. High Inflation Spells: Western Hemisphere, 1965-2001 
 
Country Episodes of inflation above         
40 percent 
Total number of years and months 
with inflation above 40 percent 
Argentina 1970:8-1992:2 21 years, 6 months 
Bolivia 1972:9-1974:12 
1978:12-1986:12 
10 years, 6 months 
Brazil 1980:1-1995:5  16 years, 4 months 
Chile 1971:5-1978:6 7 years, 1 month 
Costa Rica 1980:9-1983:6 2 years, 9 months 
Dominican Republic 1984:1-1985:11 
1987:7-1989:6 
1989:8-1991:8 
5 years, 9 months 
Ecuador 1982:5-1984:4 
1987:4-1993:8 
1997:10-2001:4 
9 years, 11 months 
Guatemala 1985:3-1986:6 
1989:6-1991:4 
3 years, 1month 
Guyana 1988:1-1991:12 3 years, 11 months 
Haiti 1993:5-1995:1 1 year, 8 months 
Jamaica 1977:7-1979:4 
1990:7-1992:12 
4 years, 2 months 
Mexico 1981:5-1988:12 
1994:12-1996:1 
8 years, 8months 
Nicaragua 1978:6-1980:5 
1982:8-1992:2 
9 years, 6 months 
Paraguay 1985:4-1986:4 
1989:5-1991:1 
2 years, 1 month 
Peru 1975:9-1993:11 18 years, 2 month 
Suriname 1986:5-1987:12 
1991:5-1995:11 
6 years, 1month 
Uruguay 1962:12-1969:1 
1972:1-1981:1 
1982:2-1995:9 
24 years, 6 months 
Venezuela 1988:2-1997:7 9 years, 5 months 
Western Hemisphere average  9 years, 6 months 
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fischer,  
  Sahay and Végh (2001), Mitchell (1982), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). 
  Notes: Hyper inflation refers to Cagan’s definition—a hyperinflation begins in the month the rise in prices exceeds  
50% and ending in the month the monthly rise in prices drops below that amount and stays below. See Fischer, Sahay  
and Végh (2001) for a recent discussion of hyperinflations. 
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Table 7. Vulnerability to High Inflation and Currency Crashes 
1965-2001 
 
 
Region or Group 
 
Probability of having 
inflation greater than 
40 percent 
 (in percent) 
(1) 
 
Average 
duration of spells 
where inflation is 
above 40 percent 
(2) 
 
Probability of a 
Severe Currency 
Crash in any 24 
month period 
(3) 
 
Probability of a 
Currency Crash 
in any 24 month 
period 
(4) 
North Africa 1.0 4 months 5.4 7.2 
Sub Saharan 
Africa, CFA 
2.1  
9 months 
 
5.4 
 
5.4 
Sub Saharan 
Africa, Non CFA 
17.8 6 years, 7months 32.4 48.6 
Asia 3.2 1 year, 2months 12.4 23.8 
Europe and 
Middle East 
16.4 6 years, 1 month 20.5 36.8 
Western 
Hemisphere 
 
25.6 9 years., 6 months 32.4 48.6 
    Sources: Tables 1-4 and Appendix Tables 1-6. 
 
 
 Another manifestation of uncertainty that can be expected to affect the investment 
climate is the incidence of currency crashes—which is, of course, intimately related to the 
inflation performance. Since the CFA franc zone has had a long history of a stable exchange 
rate versus the French franc first and now versus the euro, we now turn out attention to 
documenting currency crashes for, mostly, the non CFA countries.5 
 
As we discuss in Section IV, it has been a common practice in many African 
countries to peg the official exchange rate to some anchor currency (often the US dollar). 
Sometimes this was done in the context of dual markets, and sometimes in the context of an 
inflation stabilization plan. Some of these currency crashes, however, did not take place 
against the backdrop of a pegged official exchange rate but, rather, against a backdrop of a 
loss of monetary control.  
 
To compare Africa’s performance in this dimension to that of other regions, we 
constructed two measures of currency crashes, that are very similar to those introduced by 
Frankel and Rose (1996). The first of these definitions of currency crashes measures a “severe” 
currency crash, which refers to a 25 percent or higher monthly depreciation which is, in turn, at 
least 10 percent higher than the previous month’s depreciation. The “milder” version represents a 
                                                 
5 The one-time 100 percent devaluation for the franc zone countries on January 1994 is a 
well-known rare event that merits relatively little discussion in the context of exchange rate 
uncertainty. For the CFA franc zone, again, the high incidence of deflation we referred to 
earlier, has been much more of an issue. 
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12.5 percent monthly depreciation that is at least 10 percent above the preceding month’s 
depreciation. To put these magnitudes in perspective, monthly depreciations of this magnitude, 
when annualized, amount to 1, 355 and 310 percent, respectively. 
 
 Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 present regional averages, while Appendix 
Tables 1-4 give the individual country particulars. Not surprisingly, the regional patterns that 
emerge are very similar to those of the high inflation episodes. Africa (excluding CFA and 
North Africa) has a similar propensity to crash as Western Hemisphere, and both regions 
compare poorly to Asia and the other regions. Currency instability, as measured by frequent 
currency crashes, is strongly linked to poor inflation performance, and ex ante it can be 
expected that neither is conducive to a favorable inflation climate. Indeed, Kamaly (2001), 
who covers a panel of 151 countries over the 1990 to 1999, presents systematic evidence that 
that such exchange rate volatility has a significant adverse impact on FDI flows. 
 
 However, this discussion has only focused on the inflation and exchange rate crisis 
outcomes of monetary policy. A dimension of monetary policy that would also be expected 
to influence investment decisions is the transparency (or lack thereof) of the policy 
arrangement—an issue examined in the next section.  
 
 
IV.   DISTORTIONS AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY: THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 Dual markets and multiple exchange rates are—by far—the least transparent form of 
exchange rate arrangement. Usually, although not always, dual rates are accompanied by a 
variety of restrictions on capital movements. If there is (in principle) a dual market, but 
capital flows freely (as was the case in Belgium up until 1990 and the CFA zone until 1993), 
the free market premium tends to be trivially small. However, when there are tight capital 
account restrictions, dual markets can really have teeth and the free market premia can be 
astonishingly high. Under these conditions, and especially if there are multiple exchange 
rates, monetary policy is at its most opaque. It is typically also in this kind of arrangement 
that corruption can flourish with a vengeance. 
 
A.   The Prevalence of Dual Exchange Rates 
 Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) re-classification of historical exchange rate 
arrangements recognizes that the official exchange rate can be meaningless in this setting and 
that dual or multiple exchange rate practices need to be treated as a separate category. To do 
so, we constructed detailed chronologies—such as the sample one shown on Table 8 for 
Ghana. The episodes labeled “freely falling” are the instances when the 12-month inflation 
rate was above 40 percent, what we have called here “high inflation” episodes.6 The 
chronology also notes when dual or multiple exchange rate practices are in place. 
                                                 
6 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) for a detailed description of the classification strategy. 
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Table 8. Ghana: A Sample Chronology 
 
Date Classification 
Primary/Secondary/Tertiary 
Comments 
1916–July 14, 1958 Currency Board/Peg to Pound Sterling West African Pound is introduced by the 
West Africa Currency Board. 
July 14, 1958–July 19, 1965 Peg to Pound Sterling/Parallel Market Ghana Pound replaces the West African 
Pound 
July 19, 1965–November 4, 1971 Peg to Pound Sterling/Parallel Market The Cedi replaced the Ghana Pound. The 
new Cedi was introduced in 1967. 
November 4, 1971–September 1973 Managed floating/Parallel market The Cedi is officially pegged to US Dollar. 
October 1973–June 19, 1978 Freely Falling/Managed 
floating/Parallel market 
The Cedi is officially pegged to US Dollar. 
There are multiple exchange rates. 
June 19, 1978–May 1984 Freely falling/Managed 
floating/Parallel Market 
The official peg to the US Dollar is 
abandoned. There are multiple exchange 
rates. 
June 1984–April 1986 Freely floating/Parallel market There are multiple exchange rates. 
May 1986–September 19, 1986 Freely falling/Freely floating/Parallel 
Market 
There are multiple exchange rates. 
September 19, 1986–September 1987 Freely falling/Freely floating/Dual 
Market 
There are multiple exchange rates. 
October 1987–July 1989 Freely floating/Dual Market There are multiple exchange rates. 
August 1989–April 27, 1990 Freely falling/Managed floating/Dual 
Market 
There are multiple exchange rates. 
April 27, 1990–September 1990 Freely falling/Managed floating There are multiple exchange rates. 
October 1990–February 1994 Managed floating There are multiple exchange rates. Since 
early 1993, the parallel market premia has 
been in single digits. 
March 1994–July 1996 Freely falling/Managed floating  
August 1996–October 1999 Managed floating  
November 1999–March 2001 Freely falling/Managed floating  
April 2001–December 2001 
 
Managed floating  
    Notes: Formerly Gold Coast. Reference currencies are the US Dollar, the Pound Sterling, and the South African Rand. 
 
 
 The downside of this opaque type of arrangement has not been trivial for Africa. 
Easterly (2001) has stressed the negative contribution to growth of high parallel market 
premia. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) also present evidence that growth is lower and inflation 
higher for dual or multiple exchange rate arrangements. Yet, in Africa dual or multiple 
exchange rate arrangements account for about 32 percent of all observations (by country, by 
month) in the 1970-2001 period. 
 
B.   The parallel premia, distortions, and corruption 
Appendix Tables 9-11 document the likelihood that the monthly parallel market 
premia exceed three high thresholds. While a 50 percent premia would be considered already 
high, we also document the incidence of the probability—by country and region—that the 
premia exceeds 100 and 500 percent. Figures 5 and 6 provide a cross-regional comparison. 
The main point that emerges from this exercise is that to the extent that the premia is a catch- 
all for distortions, lack of transparency, and corruption, non-CFA Africa stands out from 
other regions by the extremely high incidence of very high premia. Even relative to the 
chronic-inflation crisis prone Western Hemisphere, the comparison is striking. The likelihood 
of premia above 50 percent is 35 and 23 percent for Africa and Western Hemisphere, 
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respectively. Premia above the 100 percent threshold prevail in 25 percent of the months 
during 1970-1998 in Africa—more than twice that for Western Hemisphere, while premia 
over 500 percent are present in 10 percent of the months.  
 
An interesting exercise involves looking jointly at (a) the probability that the premia 
is above 50 percent over 1970-1998 for each of the countries in our sample, and (b) the 
corruption index published by Transparency International for 2000, which assigns a value of 
zero to the most corrupt countries and a value of ten to the most transparent. The simple 
pairwise correlation between the two is 0.55, which is statistically significant at standard 
confidence levels—indeed, this simple exercise may suggest that the ranking of countries by 
their transparency exhibits considerable inertia.7 
 
C.   What does it all mean for FDI? 
We have suggested that the investment climate is adversely influenced by actual 
wars—or the odds of a war. Wars, in turn, apart from the destruction of life and 
infrastructure, seem to bring additional deterrents to investment, such as frequent currency 
crashes and high inflation. Even when not accompanied by war, the prospects of price and 
currency instability during peacetime are not conducive to FDI. Furthermore, high parallel 
market premia, which a proxy for distortions, inconsistent policies, and corruption, affect 
investment adversely. Table 9 presents a family of simple pairwise correlations to summarize 
these points, while Tables 10 and 11 present a synopsis of the literature on the empirical 
determinants of FDI. At first glance, our findings seem to depart strikingly from those of 
Gastanaga et. al (1998), who find no evidence that the parallel market premia influences FDI. 
Of course, one interpretation of our contrasting results that merits further scrutiny is that they 
have a separate variable controlling for corruption. As shown in Table 9, the premia is 
correlated with this type of index, suggesting that the results are not necessarily 
inconsistent—all the more so if, as we contend, lack of transparency breeds corruption. 
 
Table 9.  FDI to Africa:  Selected Correlations 
 
FDI and Conflict -0.31* 
FDI and Inflation: CFA countries -0.23* 
FDI and Inflation: Non CFA countries -0.17** 
FDI and the Probability that the parallel market 
premia is above 50 percent 
-0.36* 
Memorandum item:  
Parallel market premia and Corruption index -0.54* 
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 percent level while a double asterisk (**) indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
                                                 
7 The transparency index was not published prior to 2000 and our data on the parallel market 
rate ends in 1998. 
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Table 10. The Determinants of FDI: A Review of the Literature 
 
Study Sample Variables Main Results 
  Endogenous Variable Explanatory Variable  
Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
54 developing countries for 
3 different years (1976, 
1979 and 1980). 
FDI Economic determinants; real per capita GNP, 
GNP growth, inflation, balance of payments 
deficit, secondary education enrollment and 
bilateral aid from Western countries. Political 
determinants: political instability and a dummy 
for left-wing regime. 
 Two models were estimated. One included both economic and political 
determinants of FDI and the other included only economic determinants. The 
former model gave better results and the best forecasting errors. 
Edwards (1972) 58 developing countries 
covering the period 1971-
81. Annual data. 
Average ratio of OECD FDI 
flows to country i to total 
OECD FDI flows to LDCs 
and FDI to GDP. 
Real per capita income, size of government, 
openness, real exchange rate, real GDP, domestic 
investment ratio, structure of the economy, 
regional dummies and political variables 
(Stability and polarization). 
Variable were averages for the period covered. All variables were significant 
and with the expected sign except for per capita income which was 
insignificant. Both economic and political variables are important in 
determining the magnitude and the distribution of FDI but political variables 
were not as crucial as the economic ones. 
Singh and Jun 
(1995) 
31 developing countries for 
the period 1970-93. Annual 
data. 
FDI Sociopolitical instability, business operating 
conditions, international trade variables and other 
control variable. 
Not all the control variables were found significant. Sociopolitical instability, 
business operating conditions, international trade variables were found 
important factor in driving flows especially to high FDI countries. 
Gastanaga, 
Nugent and 
Pashamova 
(1998) 
49 developing countries for 
the period 1970-95. Annual 
data. 
Gross FDI flows to GDP. Lagged and future real GDP growth, black 
market exchange rate premium (BMP), the 
degree of openness to capital flows and FDI, 
lagged dependent variable, and other variables 
capturing country reforms and the degree of 
corruption. 
BMP was found to have little effect on FDI. Economic growth has significant 
effect on FDI. Corruption and corporate tax both have negative and significant 
effect on FDI. The effect of tariff varies with the model specification. 
Fernandez-Arias 
and Haumann 
(2000b) 
All countries where data 
was available for the period 
1996-98. Simple average 
was used.  
Total commercial flows to 
GDP, FDI to commercial 
flows and FDI to GDP. 
Variables capturing institutional infrastructure, 
political stability and economic policies together 
with 3 control variables; income, size and 
openness. 
In general, capital flows are drawn to countries with sound financial markets, 
capable institutions and sound political environment. The high share of FDI as 
a percentage of capital flows is not necessary and indicative of “good health”. 
Higher share of FDI is associated with riskier and financially underdeveloped 
countries with weaker institutional structure. 
Wei (2001) 59 to 93 borrowing 
countries depending on the 
endogenous variable for the 
period 1994-96. Simple 
average was used. 
Bilateral FDI compiled by 
OECD, bank lending, log 
ratio of loans to FDI, log 
ration of portfolio investment 
to FDI and FDI to total 
inflows. 
For FDI regressions: Corruption, tax rate, FDI 
incentives, FDI restrictions, log GDP, log per 
capita GDP, log distance, linguistic tie and 
exchange rate volatility. For regressions 
involving portfolio investment and loans: same 
variables but substituting a variable capturing the 
case in investing in securities and bond market 
instead of FDI restrictions and incentives 
variables and dropping as well the tax variable. 
Mainly two exercises. The first tests the effect of corruption on FDI and the 
second tests the effect of corruption on the composition of capital flows. 
Fixed-effects and random-effects specifications were used. In case of the first 
exercise, the majority of variables were and with the expected signs. 
Corruption has a very significant negative effect on FDI. Second exercise 
reveals that the higher is the corruption, the more is the composition of capital 
flows tilts toward more bank loans and portfolio flows and less of FDI. Results 
were found robust to the change in the sample period to 1997-98. 
Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) 
US investment in abroad by 
country 
Actual and planned 
expenditure abroad by U.S. 
companies. 
Foreign investment is regressed against labor 
cost, corporate taxation and agglomeration 
benefit indices such as infrastructure quality, the 
level of FDI and degree of industrialization.  
Various measures of risk and openness were also 
used. 
The classical variables (labor cost and market size) were statistically 
significant as were the three agglomeration indices. The results for the other 
indices were much more sensitive to the specification chosen. 
Sources: Excerpts from Kamaly (2001) and the authors. 
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Table 11. The Determinants of FDI: Regional Studies 
 
Study Sample Variables Estimation Technique and Main Results 
  Endogenous Variable Explanatory Variable  
Torrisi (1985) Colombia for the period 
1958-80. Annual data. 
FDI and total US FDI. Real GDP, growth rate of GDP, lag trade balance 
and a dummy capturing the establishment of a trade 
block. 
GDP coefficient was found to be significant together 
with trade balance but the latter took a negative sign. 
Bathattachrya, 
Montiel and Sharma 
(1997) 
15 Sub-Saharan African 
countries for the period 
1980-95. Annual data. 
Private flows, FDI, private 
loans all as a % of GDP. 
Lag growth rate of GDP, lag gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP, lag exports plus imports to GDP, 
lag total external debt to GDP, coefficient of 
variation of monthly real effective exchange rate 
index, lagged endogenous variable and US 3 year 
government bond yield. 
Panel analysis was used. For private flows all variables 
were significant with expected signs except real 
exchange rate variability. For FDI key variables were 
GDP growth, openness and variability of exchange 
rate. For private loans key factors were domestic 
investment and external debt ratios. US interest was 
found not to be significant in any of the regressions. 
Claessens et al. 
(1999) 
21 countries belong to 
Central and Eastern 
Europe and Former 
Soviet Union for the 
period 1992-96. Annual 
data. 
Total flows, official flows, 
all private flows, FDI, 
commercial debt flows, 
portfolio flows and short-
term flows. 
GF: 6 month LIBOR and economic growth in 
OECD. DF: GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, 
private savings, lag change in reserves, dummy for 
countries likely to become EU members, nominal 
interest rate minus rate of change of nominal 
exchange rate and domestic credit growth. 
Panel analysis was used (fixed effects and common 
intercept). Generally movements in flows are 
influenced more by fundamentals than GF. EU dummy 
was found significant in driving total flows and FDI. 
The interest rate variable was not significant in any of 
the 7 definitions of flows. Reforms appear to be the 
most important force in driving flows. 
Source: Excerpts from Kamaly (2001). 
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Our emphasis, thus far, has been on the different ways monetary policy contributes to 
spur or deter investment. We have discussed one of the causes of inflation in Africa—namely 
wars and civil conflict—but there are other causes for high and chronic inflation in the region 
that merit discussion. The next section focuses on the issue of fiscal dominance, which seems to 
be a promising explanation of why inflation has been difficult to tame in many of the countries in 
the region. 
 
 
V.   FISCAL DOMINANCE AND INFLATION 
In most of the world, and throughout most of history, episodes of very high inflation have 
almost invariably arisen out of situations of broader macroeconomic and political instability. 
Governments desperate to finance large fiscal deficits will turn to the printing presses to finance 
expenditures. Large and uncontrolled fiscal deficits occur for many reasons but political 
instability of some form is surely the leading cause. Inflation taxation is nothing new; even in 
Roman times, it was a standard technique to shave precious metal coins and recycle them in 
smaller form. Governments would also debase the currency by diluting the precious metal 
content of coins and by changing their metal content altogether. The advent of the modern 
printing press, for better or for worse, only served to vastly improve the technology for 
generating inflation. 
 
When the government is starved for resources and lacks sufficient taxation alternatives, it 
is obvious that the need to finance fiscal deficits leads to monetary expansion and inflation. An 
absolutely critical question, however, in assessing a monetary regime is to ask under what 
conditions monetary expansion and inflation policy can be separated from fiscal policy. Again, it 
is useful to frame the debate in the context of modern monetary policy among industrialized 
countries. In academic circles, there is currently a significant debate over whether “fiscal 
dominance” may be the rule, rather than the exception, even in low inflation industrialized 
countries. The subtle difference from the canonical case of a poor high inflation country, 
however, is that inflation is leveraged on a much higher base of nominal debt, including not only 
currency but nominal government debt. Sargent and Wallace (1981), in their classic article 
“Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” first stressed how, even in countries with apparently strong 
monetary institutions, rising and uncontrolled government budget deficits can arguably feed back 
quickly into inflation if agents expect that someday monetary independence will snap under the 
burden of rising government debt. In theory, expectations of future money growth can be so 
large as to lead to high inflation immediately, overwhelming the efforts of the central bank to 
attain monetary tightness. 
 
Recently, the Sargent-Wallace argument has been sharpened into “The fiscal theory of 
the price level,” (Leeper, 1991; Sims; 1994; and Woodford, 1994.) The basic argument is that 
one can always write the government’s intertemporal budget constraint as 
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EQUATION 1: (Nominal government debt)/ price level =  
 
The present value of real government taxes (including the inflation tax) minus  
the present value of real government expenditures 
 
Equation (1) simply states that the present value of the government’s future surpluses, 
including the inflation tax, must equal the real value of its debt (nominal debt over the price 
level.) For simplicity, we have simplified by looking at a certainty equivalent formulation. In 
reality, of course, the right hand side of equation (1) would actually correspond to a function of 
the expected value of future government surpluses, which are uncertain. Equation (1) has to hold 
if the government is solvent; if the real value of expected future surpluses were less than the real 
value of the debt, the market value of the debt would have to drop immediately, which could be 
effected by an increase in the price level. (Things are a bit trickier in a sticky-price world where 
bonds would temporarily sell at discount, but in the long run prices would adjust and the story is 
the same.) If people expected that the government would never run surpluses, they would never 
voluntarily hold government debt except for money needed to finance transactions. Of course, in 
many developing countries, domestic banks are sometimes forced to hold government debt, but 
in terms of equation (1), forced holding of government debt should be thought of as a way of 
expanding the taxes that enter on the left hand side. 
 
Equation (1), of course, is nothing new--it is simply a budget constraint that has long 
been well understood. However, in the traditional literature on industrialized countries, it was 
typically assumed that the path of the price level could be determined by monetary policy, via a 
traditional relationship where 
 
EQUATION 2:   Supply of real balances = Nominal money/ price level 
= The demand for real money balances 
 
Given the price level and the future path of monetary policy (implied by the monetary authorities 
prospective as well as current policies), the price level in equation (1) is given. Because today’s 
value of nominal government debt is given by history, the implication is that in order to ensure 
that equation (1) holds, fiscal policy must adjust, if not today, then in the future. Thus, the 
implicit assumption is that the monetary authorities never have to capitulate to the fiscal 
authorities, so that monetary policy is “dominant” in the determination of the price level. 
 
The fiscal theory of the price level challenges this assumption that monetary policy is 
dominant. Instead, advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level argue that, even in 
industrialized countries, fiscal policy is dominant and it is monetary policy that must adjust. 
More precisely, monetary policy can adopt an interest rate policy, and the path of prices will 
adjust. In a flexible price world, the initial price level must therefore adjust to assure that 
intertemporal budget balance is attained in a manner consistent with the path of primary 
surpluses (which is exogenous) and the path of interest rates (which is exogenous).  
 
There is considerable debate in the academic literature over whether the fiscal theory of 
the price level really applies, or whether the traditional view that monetary policy is dominant in 
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setting the price level is the correct one. Very recent work has started to focus on whether there 
is some threshold level debt and fiscal position that will tilt the balance from monetary to fiscal 
dominance. For the low inflation industrialized countries, the evidence appears to suggest that 
the traditional monetary dominance paradigm is still the correct one. Canzoneri, Cumby and 
Diba (2001), for example, show empirically that a rise in (an innovation in) the government 
surplus typically causes a rise in future surpluses and a fall in future government liabilities. The 
traditional monetary dominant regime offers a simple explanation, namely that shocks that lead 
to surpluses tend to be positively correlated over time. Thus, a rise in the path of surpluses allows 
the government to pay down part of the government debt leading to a fall in future liabilities. The 
fiscal theory of the price level can explain these results also, but the explanation is rather 
contorted. The rise in surplus today must eventually become negatively correlated with future 
surpluses, and this negative correlation must be great enough to make the present value of the 
future surpluses fall (rather than rise), thus leading to a fall in the value of liabilities. (Part of 
what makes the fiscal theory of the price level so popular among young researchers is precisely 
the fact that it gives such counterintuitive results.) For industrialized countries, there are also 
other reasons to be skeptical about the fiscal theory of the price level. For example, it can be 
shown that as long as the path of government real deficits has some self-correcting mechanism, 
so that deficits decline as debt grows, monetary policy dominance must prevail. For example, the 
budget and deficit conditions of the Maastricht treaty turn out to be sufficient to ensure monetary 
dominance, indeed they are much stronger than is necessary. Also, it turns out that in, say, a two 
country world, it is not logically possible to have the fiscal theory of the price level hold in both 
countries, provided they have open trade and capital markets (Loyo, 1996).  
 
 Although the fiscal theory of the price level may not be empirically relevant for 
industrialized countries outside extreme circumstances, it may be more relevant for emerging-
market and developing countries. In particular, the conditions on self-correcting budget deficits 
needed to ensure monetary dominance may not always hold, so that fiscal nomination of the 
price level becomes theoretically feasible. This is almost certainly the case in very high inflation 
countries where monetary institutions have little meaningful independence from the central 
government. Unfortunately, we do not have firm evidence yet on the factors which determine 
when fiscal dominance occurs, although the factors almost surely include high debt levels. For 
example, government debt/GDP levels above 200 percent are almost never observed (except in 
cases of concessional lending), presumably because fiscal dominance comes into play and the 
real debt level is restrained by inflation and by inflation expectations. Debt levels below 50 
percent of GDP, however, may still be a problem in countries that have very weak tax systems. 
In Table 12, below, we present some suggestive evidence on the possible link between debt 
levels and inflation for African countries for various periods. The simple correlations between 
overall government debt-to-GDP or debt-to-exports mostly go in the right direction. For the CFA 
franc zone group, these are strikingly high and always statistically significant, irrespective of 
what sample period or what measure of indebtedness is used. For the non-CFA franc African 
countries, the results are somewhat more sensitive to the sample and debt measure that is used. 
There is a strongly significant correlation between debt-to-exports and inflation in the earlier part 
of the sample which breaks down in the 1990s—at the same time that the correlation between 
debt-to-GDP and inflation is increasing and becoming significant in the more recent period. 
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Figures 8 and 9 show the scatter plots of the underlying data for CFA and non CFA countries 
respectively. 
 
Table 12. Inflation and Debt: Is there a link? 
1970-2001 
 
  Correlation of Annual Inflation and Debt/GDP Ratio 
 
Period North Africa and 
Sub Saharan Africa 
CFA Franc Zone Non-CFA Franc Zone 
1970-2001 0.308* 0.950* 
 
0.186 
 
1990-2001 0.196* 
 
0.898* 
 
0.209* 
 
1970-1979,1980-1989, 
1990-2001 
0.182* 
 
0.669* 
 
0.202* 
 
1980-1989, 1990-2001 0.192* 0.803* 
 
0.216* 
 
  Correlation of Annual Inflation and Debt/Exports Ratio 
 
1970-2001 0.548* 
 
0.961* 
 
0.518* 
 
1980-1989 0.414* 
 
0.964* 
 
0.311* 
 
1990-2001 0.091 
 
0.969* 
 
0.096 
 
1970-1979,1980-1989, 
1990-2001 averages 
0.115 0.860* 0.137 
1980-1989, 1990-2001 
averages 
0.100 0.931* 0.115 
    Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
 We have presented evidence that major events, such as wars and civil unrest occur more 
frequently in Africa than in other regions. We think that the probability of such adverse 
outcomes has a critical influence on the investment climate. Such disastrous events often bring 
other evils with them, including high inflation, a higher level of other distortions such as capital 
controls that help parallel and illegal currency markets thrive. While bouts of high inflation and 
all-too-frequent currency crashes are not unique to Africa (witness Western Hemisphere’s track 
record in this regard), the level of opaqueness and distortions, as revealed by the persistent 
prevalence of extremely high parallel market premia, is a more unique (non CFA) African 
phenomenon. In this regard, we believe there are tremendous benefits to be reaped by adopting 
unified exchange rate regimes broadly throughout the region. 
 
 These challenges are, indeed, difficult to overcome, but not insurmountable. Not many 
years ago, Uganda suffered from all the ills discussed in this paper: war, high inflation, frequent 
collapses in its currency, and dual markets with a parallel market premia that hit 567 percent in 
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1988. The end of the war was, of course, the most critical change. But macroeconomic 
stabilization, has brought inflation down to below 5 percent, growth has sharply rebounded, and 
FDI has risen from zero to more than 4 percent of GDP. With stabilization came the end of dual 
markets and increasing transparency—at time of this writing the Ugandan shilling is one of the 
more convertible currencies in sub-Saharan Africa. Nor is the strong performance by Uganda 
unique in the region. As discussed in the most recent World Economic Outlook, countries like 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania 
have been consistently strong performers in recent years, both in terms of their macroeconomic 
policies and growth performance. While some of these countries have experienced an increase in 
FDI in recent years, unfortunately not all of them have—which highlights how much persistence 
and consistency it takes to build an attractive investment climate. Nevertheless, a unified 
exchange rate regime (or at least very low parallel premia) is a key element in a transparent 
macroeconomic framework, and would help produce many beneficial side effects in terms of 
improving governance and reducing corruption. 
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Figure 1. U.S. Monetary Policy and Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies: 
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Figure 2. GDP Growth: World and G7
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
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Figure 3. Africa: Inflation vs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflow, 1970-2001
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Figure 4. Western Hemisphere: Inflation vs. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflow,1970-2001
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  and International 
Financial Statistics , Pick and Sedillot (1971), International Currency Analysis, World Currency Report , various issues, and 
authors' calculation.
Figure 5. Percent of Months in Which the Parallel Market Premia was Above 
50%: 1979-1998
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
N.Africa Non CFA
Africa
Asia Europe Middle East Western Hem.
Pe
rc
en
t
Figure 6. Percent of Months in Which the Parallel Market Premia was Above 
500%: 1979-1998
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Figure 7.  Inflation and High Parallel Market Premia
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Figure 8. CFA Franc Zone
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Figure 9. Sub Saharan Africa 
(excludes Democratic People's Republic of Congo)
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The costs of inflation 
 
Is inflation by itself such a problem? The answer is almost surely yes, but economists’ 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the question is remarkably thin. Because high inflation so 
seldom occurs in isolation from other macroeconomic problems, time series or cross-country 
regressions that show a cost of inflation on growth or output are not always convincing, since it 
is difficult to hold everything else constant. For inflation rates over forty percent per annum, 
there does seem to be evidence that growth is retarded (see Easterly, 2001 and Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2002). For lower inflation rates, below forty percent, the evidence is more limited. This 
is not to say that a country that has an inflation rate of ten percent is not clearly better off than a 
country with an inflation rate of twenty percent, and that a country with an inflation rate of two 
percent is not better off than one with ten percent. The general reduction in inflation rates that 
has taken place across much of the world over the past ten to twenty years has almost surely been 
a factor in raising global growth and increasing macroeconomic stability. Recall again Figure 2 
of the text, which gives annual growth rates both for the world (using PPP weights) and for the 
G7 group of countries. Visually, the decease in volatility of output growth since the mid-1980s, 
is striking. Not all countries have enjoyed the same improvement in macroeconomic stability 
over this period. The United States has enjoyed a particularly large drop in output volatility since 
the mid-1980s (see Stock and Watson, 2002), whereas output volatility for Germany appears to 
have remained roughly constant (reflecting no doubt German unification in 1991) and for Japan, 
it has actually increased (an outgrowth of the bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 
1990s, and a reduction in trend productivity growth.) But for most countries, increasing 
monetary stability has been accompanied by increased output stability. The casual  
evidence presented in Figure 2 I may or may not stand up to careful statistical testing; that is not 
our purpose here. But it is evidence of a broad trend that has helped persuade many that 
increasing monetary stability does pay off, even at lower levels of inflation. 
 
 At a theoretical level, it has taken even longer to assess why inflation matters, especially 
if it is stable and anticipated. Fischer and Modigliani (1977) is an early attempt to try to 
catalogue all the various and sundry theoretical costs of inflation. Their basic conclusion is that 
the main costs of stable and perfectly anticipated inflation are the “shoe-leather costs,” that is, 
the costs to people of having to economize on their holdings of (real) currency balances in order 
to minimize their share of the inflation tax. The costs of unanticipated inflation are much greater, 
particularly in a world of imperfect information and imperfect indexing. Keynes (1936), of 
course, argued that in the real world, indexing of wages and prices to inflation is very limited (at 
low to moderate levels of inflation), so that monetary volatility translates directly into variability 
in output and employment. Though economists have made little progress in understanding 
exactly why nominal rigidities are so important, Keynes’ basic insight is very much alive today. 
There is a broader question of why, even in today’s hyper-sophisticated (indeed hyperactive) 
financial markets, there is not greater capacity to index to inflation. Absent such indexation, and 
given long-term nominal contracts, then uncertain inflation is quite harmful to economic activity, 
making investment planning difficulty, and making it difficult to continuously maintain full 
employment (or whatever the modern search-theory equivalent of full employment is). The 
government is possibly the greatest source of nominal rigidities in the economy. Tax systems, 
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especially, have important non-neutralities. Some are well known, e.g., if tax rates are increasing 
in income, then inflation will raise average tax levels. If taxes take significant  
amounts of time to collect, then rises in the rate of inflation can lower effective real tax rates, if 
agents are able to pay the government with a lag in depreciated currency. Many governments tax 
nominal rather than real interest receipts. 
 
All of these are fairly primitive failures of indexation. Feldstein (1998) has emphasized 
that the effective rate of capital taxation—which is enormously complicated to calculate in 
practice—can be very sensitive to inflation rates even at low levels. For example, even starting 
from an inflation rate as low as two percent, a one percent reduction in inflation might raise the 
capital stock as much as 3 percent, according to Feldstein’s calculations. In principle, this 
problem could be solved via adequate indexation of the corporate income tax. In practice, the 
accounting issues are so complicated that it is much easier to deal with the problem by simply 
having a lower rate of inflation. This last example is particularly interesting because it highlights 
how, in the complex modern world, the distinction between high inflation and variable inflation 
is not as sharp as one might think. When one looks at corporate accounting and taxation, 
inflation can lead to problems even if when it changes only very slowly, since it is so costly to 
adapt capital taxation and depreciation rules adequately to compensate. 
 
The more important distinction, for our purposes here, is to distinguish between the 
effects of inflation in isolation from other forms of macroeconomic instability (e.g., if a modern 
industrialized-country central bank mistakenly, and temporarily, adapts an inefficient control 
technique), from the costs of inflation instability in a country where the government has a short-
time horizon and where inflation is accompanied by numerous other macroeconomic problems. 
The latter is almost surely the typical case in most countries where inflation is over 40 percent.
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Table 13. Currency Crashes: North Africa and CFA Franc Zone Countries, 1965-2001 
 
Country/Group Dates of Severe Currency Crashes Number of 
Severe Crashes 
Total Number of Crashes 
including Severe Crashes 
North Africa    
   Algeria 1991:1, 1991:9, 1994:4 3 4 
  Morocco  0 0 
  Tunisia  0 0 
Average for the region  1 1.33 
Sub-Saharan Africa CFA    
  Benin 1994:1 1 1 
  Burkina Faso 1994:1 1 1 
  Cameroon 1994:1 1 1 
  Chad 1994:1 1 1 
  Central African Republic 1994:1 1 1 
  Congo, Republic of 1994:1 1 1 
  Cote D’Ivoire 1994:1 1 1 
  Equatorial Guinea    
  Guinea-Bissau 1994:1 1 1 
  Mali 1994:1 1 1 
  Niger 1994:1 1 1 
  Senegal 1994:1 1 1 
  Togo 1994:1 1 1 
Average for the region 
 
 1 1 
  Notes: Two definitions of currency crashes are used. A severe currency crash refers to a 25% or higher monthly 
depreciation which is at least 10% higher than the previous month’s depreciation. The “milder” version represents 
a 12.5% monthly depreciation which is at least 10% above the preceding month’s depreciation. To put in 
perspective the monthly depreciations annualized are 1, 355% and 310%, respectively. 
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Table 14. Currency Crashes: Sub Saharan Africa Non CFA Franc Zone Countries, 1965-2001 
 
Country/Group Dates of Severe Currency Crashes Number of 
Severe Crashes 
Total Number of Crashes 
including Severe Crashes 
Angola 1991:3, 1991:11, 1991:12, 1992:4, 1993:1, 
1993:3, 1993:10, 1994:2, 1994:6, 1994:10, 
1995:4, 1995:5, 1995:8, 1995:9, 1996:2, 1996:3, 
1996:5, 1997:7, 1999:5, 1999:7, 1999:9, 2000:5 
22 25 
Botswana  0 4 
Burundi 1983:11 1 7 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 
1967:6, 1976:3, 1978:11, 1979:1, 1979:7, 1980:2, 
1981:6, 1983:9, 1990:11, 1991:2, 1991:7, 1991:8, 
1991:10, 1991:11, 1992:1, 1992:3, 1992:5, 
1992:6, 1992:9, 1992:10, 1993:1, 1993:6, 1993:8, 
1993:11, 1993:12, 1994:2, 1994:7, 1995:8, 
1995:9, 1995:11, 1996:1, 1997:5, 1998:10, 
1999:4, 2000:1, 2000:6, 2000:10 
37 44 
Ethiopia 1992:10 1 1 
Gambia 1986:1 1 4 
Ghana 1967:7, 1971:12, 1972:2, 1978:8, 1983:10, 
1984:11, 1986:1, 1987:2 
8 10 
Guinea 1986:1, 1986:12, 1987:1 3 4 
Kenya  0 5 
Lesotho 1985:8 1 6 
Liberia 1998:1 1 2 
Madagascar 1987:6, 1994:5 2 5 
Malawi 1987:2, 1994:2, 1994:10, 1998:8 4 13 
Mauritania 1992:10 1 2 
Mauritius 1979:10 1 3 
Mozambique 1981:1, 1987:7, 1988:7, 1991:4 4 6 
Nigeria 1986:10, 1989:1, 1992:3, 1999:1 4 7 
Rwanda 1966:4, 1990:11, 1994:3, 1994:8, 1995:3 5 7 
Somalia 1982:7, 1984:9, 1985:1, 1986:1, 1987:6, 1987:9, 
1988:6, 1989:5, 1989:12 
9 11 
South Africa 1985:8 1 6 
Sudan 1979:9, 1981:11, 1982:11 1985:2, 1987:10, 
1991:10, 1992:2, 1993:11, 1994:7, 1995:9, 
1995:12, 1996:1 
12 13 
Swaziland  0 6 
Tanzania 1983:6, 1984:6, 1986:6 3 6 
Uganda 1981:6, 1985:11, 1987:5, 1988:7, 1989:10 5 12 
Zambia 1976:7, 1983:1, 1985:10, 1986:10, 1987:2, 
1987:4, 1989:7, 1992:2, 1992:12, 1993:11, 
1994:1, 1994:3, 1994:10, 1994:11 
14 22 
Zimbabwe 1991:9, 1997:12, 2000:8 3 6 
Average for the region  6 9 
Average for the region 
excluding hyperinflation 
countries (i.e., Angola and 
Congo) 
 4 7 
  Notes: Two definitions of currency crashes are used. A severe currency crash refers to a 25% or higher monthly 
depreciation which is at least 10% higher than the previous month’s depreciation. The “milder” version represents a 
12.5% monthly depreciation which is at least 10% above the preceding month’s depreciation. To put in perspective 
the monthly depreciations annualized are 1, 355% and 310%, respectively. 
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Table 15. Currency Crashes: Asia, Europe and Middle East, 1965-2001 
 
Country Dates of Severe Currency Crashes Number of 
Severe Crashes 
Total Number of 
Crashes including 
Severe Crashes 
China, Hong Kong  0 0 
China, People’s Republic 1989:12, 1994:1 2 3 
India 1966:6 1 3 
Indonesia 1967:11, 1978:11, 1983:4, 1986:9, 1997:12, 
1998:1, 1998:5, 1998:10 
8 12 
Korea 1998:12 1 5 
Lao 1972:4, 1975:3, 1976:6, 1978:5, 1979:12, 1981:6, 
1985:10, 1987:9, 1997:12, 1998:6, 1999:9 
11 15 
Malaysia  0 0 
Myanmar 1975:1 1 2 
Nepal 1967:12 1 5 
Pakistan 1972:5 1 2 
Philippines 1970:2, 1983:10, 1984:6 3 5 
Singapore  0 0 
Sri Lanka 1977:11, 1998:5, 1998:7 3 6 
Thailand  0 3 
Average for the region  2.3 4.4 
Country/Region Dates of Severe Currency Crashes Number of 
Severe Crashes 
Total Number of 
Crashes including 
Severe Crashes 
Egypt 1979:1, 1989:8, 1990:7, 1991:3 4 4 
Iceland 1967:11, 1968:11, 1975:2, 1983:5 4 13 
Iran 1993:3, 2000:12 2 2 
Iraq  0 0 
Israel 1974:11, 1977:11, 1983:10 3 5 
Jordan  0 1 
Lebanon 1985:1, 1986:1, 1986:5, 1986:11, 1987:3, 1987:7, 
1987:8, 1987:10, 1990:8, 1990:8, 1990:10, 
1991:1, 1992:7 
13 19 
Poland 1980:12, 1981:12, 1989:8, 1989:9, 1989:11, 
1989:12 
6 15 
Romania 1984:11, 1990.2,1990:11,1991:4, 1991:11, 
1992:6, 1997:1 
7 13 
Saudi Arabia  0 0 
Syria, Arab Republic 1988:1 1 1 
Turkey 1970:8, 1978:3, 1979:6, 1980:1, 1994:4, 2001:2 6 9 
Average for the region  3.8 6.8 
  Notes: Two definitions of currency crashes are used. A severe currency crash refers to a 25% or higher monthly 
depreciation which is at least 10% higher than the previous month’s depreciation. The “milder” version represents a 
12.5% monthly depreciation which is at least 10% above the preceding month’s depreciation. To put in perspective 
the monthly depreciations annualized are 1, 355% and 310%, respectively. 
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Table 16. Currency Crashes: Western Hemisphere, 1965-2001 
 
Country Dates of Severe Currency Crashes Number of 
Severe Crashes 
Total Number of 
Crashes including 
Severe Crashes 
Argentina 1967:3, 1975:3, 1975:6 1975:11, 1976:3, 1976:11, 
1981:4, 1981:6, 1982:1, 1982:7, 1987:10, 1989:4, 
1989:7 1989:12, 1990:2, 1991:1 
16 23 
Brazil 1979:12, 1983:2, 1987:5, 1989:6, 1989:7, 
1989:12, 1990:2, 1991:10, 1999:1 
9 15 
Bolivia 1972:10, 1982:2, 1982:11, 1983:11, 1984:4, 
1984:8, 1984:11, 1985:2, 1985:5, 1985:9, 1985:11 
11 12 
Chile 1967:1, 1971:7, 1972:9, 1973:5, 1973:7, 1973:10, 
1974:12, 1975:3, 1985:7 
9 12 
Colombia 1965:9 1  
Costa Rica 1974:4, 1981:1, 1981:10 3 4 
Dominican Republic 1985:1, 1990:8 2 4 
Ecuador 1970:8, 1982:5, 1983:3, 1985:12, 1986:8, 1988:8, 
1999:2, 1999:10 
8 12 
El Salvador 1986:1, 1990:5 2 2 
Guatemala 1986:6, 1990:8 2 3 
Guyana 1987:1, 1989:4, 1990:6, 1991:2,1999:3 5 9 
Haiti 1991:9, 2000:9 2 3 
Honduras 1990:3, 1990:4 2 2 
Jamaica 1978:5, 1983:11, 1991:9 3 10 
Mexico 1976:9, 1982:2, 1982:12, 1987:12, 1994:12 5 7 
Nicaragua 1979:4, 1985:2, 1986:1, 1988:2, 1988:6, 1988:8, 
1988:10, 1988:11, 1989:1, 1989:6, 1990:4, 
1990:5, 1990:8, 1990:12,1991:3 
15 16 
Panama  0  
Paraguay 1984:3, 1984:6, 1985:3, 1986:12,1989:3 5 5 
Peru 1967:9, 1976:6, 1977:10, 1987:10, 1987:12, 
1988:9, 1988:11, 1989:1, 1990:3, 1990:8 
10 15 
Suriname 1994:7, 1994:10, 1999:1, 2000:10 4 6 
Uruguay 1965:3, 1965:10, 1967:11, 1968:4, 1972:3, 
1982:11, 1982:12 
7 9 
Venezuela 1984:2, 1986:12, 1989:3, 1994:5, 1995:12, 1996:4 6 6 
Average for the region  6 9 
Average for the region 
excluding hyperinflation 
countries (i.e., Argentina, 
Brazil, and Nicaragua) 
 5 7 
  Notes: Two definitions of currency crashes are used. A severe currency crash refers to a 25% or higher monthly 
depreciation which is at least 10% higher than the previous month’s depreciation. The “milder” version represents a 
12.5% monthly depreciation which is at least 10% above the preceding month’s depreciation. To put in perspective 
the monthly depreciations annualized are 1, 355% and 310%, respectively. 
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Table 17. Incidence of High Parallel Market Premium, Africa 1970-1998: 
North Africa, CFA, and Non-CFA 
 
 Probability that the parallel market premia exceeds: 
 
Country/Group 50 Percent 100 Percent 500 Percent 
North Africa    
  Algeria 92.2 73.8 0 
  Morocco 0 0 0 
  Tunisia 0 0 0 
Average for the region 31.0 24.6 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa CFA 0 0 0 
Sub-Saharan Africa Non-CFA    
  Botswana 0 0 0 
  Burundi 17.3 0 0 
  Congo, Democratic Republic of n.a.   
  Gambia 0 0 0 
  Ghana 46.6 36.1 17.0 
  Guinea 52.2 41.9 11.4 
  Kenya 4.6 1.2 0 
  Lesotho 0 0 0 
  Liberia 89.1 89.1 29.7 
  Madagascar 1.2 0 0 
  Malawi 33.5 5 0 
  Mauritania 61.2 45.2 0 
  Mauritius 0 0 0 
  Nigeria 68.3 34.3 0 
  South Africa 0.9 0 0 
  Swaziland 0 0 0 
  Tanzania 66.9 46.3 1.2 
  Uganda 61.3 50.4 23.5 
  Zambia 57.5 28.4 4.7 
  Zimbabwe 28.8 17.0 3.2 
Average for the region 35.4 24.8 9.5 
    Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), original sources cited therein. 
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Table 18. Incidence of High Parallel Market Premium, Asia, Europe, 
and the Middle East: 1970-1998 
 
 Probability that the parallel market premia exceeds: 
 
Country/Group 50 Percent 100 Percent 500 Percent 
China, Hong Kong 
0 0 0 
China, People’s Republic 21.9 11.2 0 
India 8.6 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 
Korea 0 0 0 
Lao 
42.1 35.2 15.9 
Malaysia 0 0 0 
Myanmar 100 100 36.5 
Nepal 14.4 0 0 
Pakistan 8.9 8.1 0 
Philippines 0.9 0 0 
Singapore 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 27.1 12.7 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 
Average for the region 17.2 12.9 4.0 
 Probability that the parallel market premia exceeds: 
 
Country/Group 50 Percent 100 Percent 500 Percent 
Belgium 
0 0 0 
Iceland 8.6 0.9 0 
Israel 4.9 0 0 
Turkey 3.7 0 0 
Average for the region 8.2 0.2 0 
Egypt 
59.4 31.7 0 
Iran 65.1 59.4 29.7 
Jordan 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0.9 0.3 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 
Syria, Arab Republic 58.1 50.7 5.3 
Average for the region 26.2 20.3 5.0 
    Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), original sources cited therein. 
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Table 19. Incidence of High Parallel Market Premium, 
Western Hemisphere 1970-1998 
 
 Probability that the parallel market premia exceeds: 
 
Country/Group 50 Percent 100 Percent 500 Percent 
Argentina 
32.3 15.6 0 
Brazil 16.7 4.3 0 
Bolivia 20.5 10.7 2.0 
Chile 18.2 14.4 5.8 
Colombia 0.3 0.3 0 
Costa Rica 
8.9 0.3 0 
Dominican Republic 13.3 4.0 0 
Ecuador 17.0 3.7 0 
El Salvador 36.3 16.1 0 
Guatemala 13.8 9.6 0 
Guyana 43.7 36.5 12.6 
Haiti 74.9 37.7 0 
Honduras 29.3 2.4 0 
Jamaica 16.7 5.4 0 
Mexico 3.5 0.3 0 
Nicaragua 39.8 31.4 18.2 
Panama 0 0 0 
Paraguay 23.6 15.6 0 
Peru 32.9 7.8 1.2 
Suriname 44.7 39.4 27.4 
Uruguay 6.9 2.3 0 
Venezuela 22.2 15.3 0 
Average for the region 23.4 12.4 3.0 
  Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), original sources cited therein. 
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